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**working paper
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ON REPLACING CAPITALISM

Deep

Duncan K. Foley

Number 64

October 1970

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I

In the course of the last four years I have found myself in the middle between radical critics of capitalism, mostly younger than myself, and liberal apologists and conservative defenders of capitalism, mostly older. This rarely exhilarating, although highly educational experience has convinced me that implicit in the conflicts between radicals and liberals is among other things a complex disagreement over the possibilities for reorganizing economic institutions. What follows is an attempt to formulate this disagreement sharply. The Janus-like tone will probably please no one, but seems inherent in the attempt to bring the two sides into a coherent confrontation.

Let me begin by summarizing four radical criticisms of capitalism to serve as centers of argument. They all seem to me to be defensible propositions about tendencies of capitalist society as it exists in the United States.

First, modern capitalist economies seem always to evolve a stable and highly concentrated distribution of wealth, by which I mean ownership of valuable assets. In the United States, for example, the poorer half of the population probably owns only 5-10% of private wealth, while the richest 10% owns about 60%.* There is no evidence of significant changes in this situation over time.

* Lampman, Robert J. The Share of Top Wealth-Holders in National Wealth. Princeton University Press: Princeton 1962.

In Great Britain, despite a substantial redistribution of income from middle to working-class families through taxes and welfare, wealth is even more con-

centrated. This concentration of wealth, while it is perhaps objectionable in itself, has a more serious political consequence in that it leads to a similar concentration of influence and power, so that, whether political institutions are formally democratic or authoritarian, decisions tend to be taken in the interests of a small class of wealthy people. The mechanisms through which wealth makes its influence felt are well and widely known: control of media, support of political candidates, lobbying, power over public and, to a greater extent, private education, influence peddling, bribery, in fact through the entire spectrum of political activity from the performance of public duty to fraud. It is not necessary to posit the existence of conspiracies to explain the disproportionate influence wealth has in politics. The interests of the wealthy are frequently at odds with that of other classes, not only in regard to taxation and provision of public services, but particularly in matters of foreign policy and defense. The wealthy, for example, naturally support a vigorous counterrevolutionary foreign policy, guarantees of unrestricted foreign investment, and military competition with foreign capitalists, matters which are of marginal or no interest to most citizens.

At the present time economists have a very imperfect understanding of the causes of this stable concentration of wealth. It may arise from natural differences in productivity and thrift, or because of inheritance laws, or as the systematic outcome of random movements of asset values, or through the exercise of fraud and force to conserve a monopoly of ownership. Until a convincing evaluation of the importance of these factors is available it seems best to assume that the concentration of wealth is a very deep-rooted phenomenon and cannot easily be altered by ordinary tools.

In a capitalist system, families are rewarded in proportion to the productivity of their labor unless they inherit valuable assets. Persons who for one reason or another have low productivity and no assets will always under capitalism have low incomes. The old, the sick, the emotionally and physically crippled, addicts, people of low intelligence and, given our family institutions, women with children but without husbands tend to have low productivity and therefore low incomes. Capitalism offers no systematic support to these people, so that more or less effective devices outside the capitalist distribution system become necessary. Charity, welfare, public housing, socialized medicine, prisons and so forth exist to support or help support persons of low productivity but they are all unnatural in a capitalist society, conflict with its basic principles, and as a result tend automatically to be controversial, badly run, inadequate and ineffective.

Third, capitalist organization of production implies an authoritarian and hierarchical structure to productive institutions. Legal control over means of production lies with the owners or their representatives and this gives managers a coercive means of discipline in production. Even when workers organize in unions they can only bargain with management; the full power of the state will resist any attempt by workers to control production democratically and directly. Workers are perpetually under the threat of coercion through losing their job if they act individually, or through police action if they act collectively, in opposition to management decisions. Productive discipline accounts for day-to-day coercion on a massive scale.

Fourth, the capitalist distribution system forces everyone into constant competition with other individuals. This produces self-reliant, independent

personalities who exhibit aggression, insecurity and suspicion. Comparison of success in achieving high income, power or status becomes the basis of most human relationships. The economic system subtly but effectively persuades the participant to see himself as a lone individual who must grab and keep what he can in competition with everyone else. Capitalist man comes to be unwilling to cooperate with other people except for immediate material benefit. He treats strangers as enemies and friends as potential betrayers. Because he is so often reminded of the threat other people represent to his well-being and because he experiences few models of cooperative human enterprise, a man in capitalist society comes to see himself as a predator who is also prey, unable to behave with mercy and survive.

II

Many people might agree that the phenomena described above are characteristic of capitalist society, but would argue that alternatives do not exist which would be any better. They feel that these objectionable features of capitalism are so closely intertwined with its advantages that innovations which attack the bad part will lead to disasters in other areas. What is capitalism doing for us as an economic system?

The most important function of capitalism is very often ignored. In an industrial society production takes place simultaneously in a vast number of independent organizations. The output of one productive enterprise most often becomes the input to some other production process. The plans of these myriad separate organizations must be coordinated so that outputs of one stage meet the input requirements of the next.

Even when plans generally fit together on average there will be occasional

shortages and bottlenecks. These shortages and bottlenecks can have amazingly catastrophic consequences for an economy unless there is some effective scheme to decide which deliveries should be made when there is not enough to make all planned deliveries.

Suppose that there is a 10% shortage of ball-bearings which are used both in locomotives and toys. Every locomotive needs one new ballbearing a month as part of its maintenance; every toy needs five ballbearings to illustrate Newton's Laws. The simple policy of reducing deliveries both to toymakers and locomotive repairmen by 10% would put 10% of the nation's locomotives out of commission, and have massive further consequences as a shortage of transportation developed. In the simple example the correct policy seems obvious, but in an economy where each producer delivers to hundreds of other producers the correct priority may be impossible for an individual organization to fathom.

This effect is surprisingly important in even moderately complicated economies. A small shortage in one sector can close down a whole economy in a matter of months.*

*Cf. Michael Manove, "A Model of Non-Price Rationing of Intermediate Goods", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, M.I.T., 1969.

There are two known ways of dealing with the fundamental problems of material balances and rationing. The question, as you can see, is one of information. How can one group of people make a decision that affects other groups? In capitalist societies markets and market prices provide enough information to assure on average coordination of plans in the simple input-output sense, and automatically ration shortages in an acceptable way. In planned

economies the same functions are performed by planning bureaucracies, which collect information and issue directives from a central point.

For some time conservative economists did not believe that bureaucracy could in fact succeed in coordinating an economy. But planning techniques are familiar in capitalist countries where they are used in times of war under the names of mobilization and price controls. The methods used in every country in the Second World War to organize munitions production, transport, and manpower, and to control prices and wages were an approximation to the planning methods of socialist countries. The war ministries were planned economies existing inside a market economy, which they could use as a source of extra inputs to alleviate planning errors. The mathematical theory of planning and central control made great advances during the war in both capitalist and socialist countries. In capitalist society this body of knowledge is called operations research and is used widely by large organizations, both public and private, to manage enterprises with many separate suborganizations.*

*In the Soviet Union, planning and planning ideology seem from the Revolution on to have been closely associated with the military and its needs and aims. Cf. Carr, E.H. The Interregnum 1923-24, esp. pp. 30-32.

There seems to be no other practical way of organizing large, complicated economies besides markets or centralized bureaucracy. This is a strong statement and I would be happy and interested to be contradicted effectively on this point. (If an economy is simple and production of most commodities involves only one or two separate producers then the problem of coordination may not be very serious. A nation of freehold farmers, each of whom supplies 90% of his own needs does not require very much economic coordination.)

It may be worthwhile emphasizing the differences between market decisions and planned ones. A single producer in a market economy can decide how much to produce and where to deliver it solely on the basis of knowing the prices he can get for his output and the prices he must pay for his input. It may appear that individuals with whom the producer deals are setting the prices and deciding for him, but he has legal and moral freedom to refuse to trade or to try to carry out some other plan. Each decision maker sees himself as being free from direct control.

If a central bureaucracy is coordinating production individual producers lose their freedom of action. Even if the central bureaucracy cannot physically coerce individual producers its directives have an overwhelming moral authority, because only the central bureaucracy has the information necessary to make a coherent decision. An individual producing unit that experiments contrary to the plan is taking a step into nihilism. The plan is the only trustworthy link between its operations and the purposes of the rest of society.

The next most important positive function of capitalism economically is the provision of large savings out of highly concentrated property income to maintain and expand the means of production. Very little net saving is done by low and even middle-income groups in capitalist society, the savings by some for children's education, retirement, and so forth being offset by the spending by others of past saving on the same things. If the capitalist class is not on the scene some other institution must be devised to channel a substantial part of the society's output into investment in a reliable and not excessively wasteful manner.

Capitalism also performs other important functions. It provides incentives for people to work. It provides opportunities for innovation and rewards successful innovators. Capitalism tends to eliminate a particular, subtle, but important kind of waste of resources. This is not a problem of wastage in individual plants, but a kind of social waste that can occur if there are separate producing units. A homely example is the case of a man with no children and a lot of land next to a man with many sons and little land. The first man may work his acres as well as he can by himself, and the second intensively cultivate his small plot with his sons as well as he can. But they could produce more together than the sum of what each can do alone by using the labor they have evenly over all the land. Free trade tends to eliminate this kind of waste, which can be very serious in an industrial economy. Unfortunately the tendency of capitalism to reduce this kind of waste, which economists are much in love with, is seriously compromised by government intervention, monopoly power, and the existence of environmental pollution.

To most older liberals and conservatives this dilemma is the central problem of replacing capitalism. The experience of the Russian Revolution and the debates in the West about socialism have for the past thirty to fifty years focused on the "planning vs. markets" issue. I think that in the popular imagination, "socialism" has come to mean centralized governmental control over production.

Whether a person thinks centralized planning is a good thing or a catastrophe seems to depend mostly on his confidence in political institutions. If a person believes that democratic political institutions are naturally stable,

responsive to the real need of society and flexible, or can be made so by some revolutionary procedure, he will be well disposed toward entrusting economic life to these institutions rather than to the anarchy and chaos of the marketplace. If a person shares the classic conservative view that democratic political institutions are fragile, unstable, hard to create and maintain, vulnerable to corruption, bureaucratic secrecy, militarism, barely able to conduct the vital business of defense without sliding into totalitarianism, he will likely rely on weak central political institutions rather than on robust decentralized economic mores.

Curiously enough both radicals and liberals can be found on either side of this debate. Among those who have confidence in political institutions the liberals tend to believe that the United States already has stable, flexible and responsive democratic procedures while the radicals reject this notion scornfully but expect to create such procedures through a revolution. Among the radicals and conservatives who distrust political institutions there is a much wider spectrum of views about social reform.

I myself think that centralized bureaucratic planning is regressive and should be firmly rejected by radicals as an alternative to capitalism. (That will be none too soon, because liberal statisticians in both Cold War camps have been trying for some time to establish planning as a consensus policy. It appeals especially to people who relish the idea of the Soviet Union and the United States growing to resemble each other in all important respects.) No agency but the national government can undertake the planning responsibility. Democracy is inevitably corrupted by the centralization of power, and no democracy could long resist the battering and strain of responsibility for foreign affairs, defense and general economic policy. Centralized planning extends

government power enormously and will be infected by the military bias of national governments, political influence peddling and bureaucratic secrecy. Capitalism may be gradually crushing democracy beneath the weight of great wealth; centralized planning will bury it in a rapid avalanche.

I also feel that current liberal attempts to meet radical criticisms of our society by extending Federal controls and regulation of business are a fraud, because the reality of political influence in our society precludes any government action that significantly alters power and wealth relationships. New extensions of control and regulation will be perverted, as old ones have been, into instruments for restricting competition and protecting vested interests.

It is at this point that argument generally ends. "Bad as it is, the alternatives to capitalism are worse." "Why don't you go to Russia?" But this is precisely where it should begin. Does reliance on markets and free exchange between productive organizations necessarily entail accepting the four evils I mentioned to begin with?

Analysis of this question, though a persistent theme on the left, seems to have fallen into eclipse. The Communist Left became committed to planning soon after the Russian Revolution. The non-Communist Left seems to be split into those radicals who know very little economics and fail to understand the dilemma, and those liberals who do grasp the issues, but take it for granted that capitalism is the only solution. It is the tension between their discomfort about the criticisms of capitalism and their fatalist conviction that capitalism is a necessary evil that has made liberals such well-integrated, happy and effective personalities, though it has contributed to the failure of most of their meliorative policies.

It is not however impossible to think about market economies which avoid some of the deficiencies of modern capitalism. There are several ideas floating about which fall into this general category.

III

Capitalism with a Human Face

It may happen that intelligent conservatives will adopt a policy of the maximum melioration possible without altering the basic institutional framework of capitalism (the wage system, and private property in the means of production). Such a policy might include the reining in of the military, sharply reducing our commitments abroad and using the resources released in this way to finance a negative income tax, large scale housebuilding, rent supplements, universal medical insurance and more (possibly even better) education. Since even total elimination of defense spending will not cover all these items the middle classes would have to accept higher taxes.

This kind of policy is the classic conservative response to revolutionary crisis; typically reforms of the worst evils of the system accompany repression of dissidents and revolutionaries. The reforms preempt revolutionary propaganda and the repression terrorizes potential mass support of the revolution. We can discern faintly the elements of this kind of policy in recent enacted and proposed legislation: tax reform, welfare reform, draft reform, defense spending cuts combined with "anti-crime" bills, repressive prosecutions and police liquidation of black and student revolutionaries. If the policy is going to work, both reform and repression have to be present in some degree. Reform without repression gives an impression of weakness of the ruling class

and by appearing to reward revolutionaries increases their prestige and credibility. Repression without reform risks civil war.

The attractiveness of this conservative policy depends on one's point of view. It offers a good hope of preserving the present ruling class or coalition in power without civil war. The reforms might do something toward easing the lot of the most obvious victims of the capitalist system, but are irrelevant to the last three of the four criticisms of capitalism with which I began. Democracy would not be in any better shape, and would probably be worse off since the middle and lower classes would find themselves in perpetual political conflict even more bitter than at present over taxes and welfare benefits. Hierarchical discipline in production and the corrosive effect of capitalism on personality would continue completely unchecked. It is not clear that this strategy, though it might provide some short-term sense of euphoria and achievement, would over a long period reduce conflict or lead to a better social settlement.

IV

Workers' Control

The workers of each productive unit might simply take it over and begin running it themselves. I think "workers" in this context must be taken broadly to include even top executives. The basic power to control the means of production would shift from capitalist owners to workers' organizations of some kind. Many people reject this idea as "utopian" and "unworkable".

I think that workers' control will function without a catastrophic disruption of production as long as each productive unit is forced to buy its

inputs and sell its outputs on markets as corporations do now. The quickest way to ruin and discredit an experiment in workers' control is for the government to step in to try to retrieve failing organizations, by supporting prices of some goods, subsidizing some plants, or taking over "badly managed" organizations. Workers' control must include the right of workers to make mistakes and make experiments (which come to much the same thing).

This reform at one stroke could attack hierarchical discipline and concentration of wealth (because existing stockholders would be expropriated). It raises many interesting questions amenable to economic analysis.*

*Vanek, Jaroslav. The General Theory of Labor Managed Market Economies. Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970.

First, the workers in an organization at the time of expropriation become the residual claimants to income--they get the profits. They will find in many cases after a short time that their profit will be increased by adding new workers in addition to themselves. Will the old workers be permitted to hire these new workers for ordinary wages? This is a more complicated question than it seems, because in many cases the new worker will have special skills that make him very valuable to the others, and such a worker may demand a wage equal to his productivity. It seems to me that there will be strong pressures tending to restore the wage system.

If the original workers obtained exclusive ownership of the capital and refused to share it with new workers there would come to be two classes of worker; propertied workers and propertyless workers. It would not take long for other features of capitalism to reappear. On the other hand, if new workers were admitted freely to the plant democracy there would be re-

luctance on the part of the original workers to admit newcomers, because newcomers would dilute the profits. Men doing the same work might receive very different wages because the worker in the high wage plant would refuse to hire the lower paid man.

Second, at the time of the revolutionary expropriation some workers will find themselves in possession of much more valuable assets than others. Workers in public utilities, for example, will obtain the ownership of immense capital resources, while sweat-shopped garment workers will get only their sewing machines.

Third, as time passes some productive enterprises will find themselves with substantial saved earnings and others with good prospects but in need of capital funds. In some way a market for capital will be needed to match up savers and investors. (Even if the first organization paid out all its profits to its workers, individual workers may want to save and the funds must find their way somehow back to expanding organizations.) It will be very desirable for workers in one plant either collectively or individually to lend to workers in other plants or own shares or stock. This movement of capital is necessary for the economy to grow and become more productive (or even to hold its own under changing circumstances). But the legal institutions, the contracts or intermediaries used to achieve it, will threaten the principle of workers' control unless they are cleverly and nicely designed.

Related to the problem of channeling saving in a reasonable way into additions to productive capacity is the problem of generating savings in the first place. One proposal is that the government tax workers' capital at a fixed rate, collecting in this way part of what we call profit in a capitalist society. The government could then reinvest this income to provide

the necessary saving. Even with this tax it is possible that great disparities in ownership of wealth may grow up among workers' collectives. To predict whether or not this would happen would require a deeper understanding of the problem of inequality of wealth in capitalist society, which I mentioned earlier.

Although the difficulties I have just described tend to weaken the argument for workers' control by suggesting that certain features of capitalism will reassert themselves, there would be undeniable advantages. Shop discipline would gain in moral authority by being based on democracy, and persuasion would take the place of coercion in many cases. The cultural gap between workers of different classes might tend to disappear as talented workers moved up into management jobs and untalented bureaucrats learned to run the machines. Promotion from below might turn out to be shrewder and more accurate than promotion from above. The politicization of the plant would encourage individuals to see themselves as responsible, powerful, and able to affect important parts of their environment. The fact that profits would be shared democratically would tend to emphasize the individual's interest in cooperation as a counter-balance to the competitiveness of the wage system.

Workers' control implies a substantial redistribution of economic power within productive groups. It does not, by itself, attack the first problem I mentioned, the plight under capitalism of people who for one reason or another are simply unproductive. While individuals might not be able to accumulate enormous wealth, groups of workers could do so, and might begin to wield disproportionate political influence, though not perhaps to precisely the same ends as capitalists.

Communes, Cooperatives and Kibbutzim

If nationalization of the means of production represents socialism in the large, cooperatives and communes represent socialism in the small. Men, women, and children in groups could treat each other in many respects as family members treat each other in capitalist society, especially in sharing the group's income and wealth. The groups if they were small enough could compete among themselves, and trade with each other through markets as individuals do under capitalism.

There are many variants of the commune idea. I think communes are most usefully classified according to a) whether or not they trade with the outside world, b) whether or not the commune controls means of production, and c) whether the commune shares its income in kind, like a capitalist family, or in money.

Utopian farming communities are usually isolated from the outside world, share in kind and control the means of production. Kibbutzim are cooperatives that trade with the outside world, control the means of production, and sometimes share income in kind, sometimes in money. There are urban communes in Western countries which trade with the outside world, do not own the means of production, and share in kind. There may be some that share in money.

The great difficulty with communities that refuse to trade with the world is that they forego the enormous gains in productivity that detailed specialization makes possible. They condemn themselves by this choice to a life of fearfully hard work, little leisure and no comfort. In the past only fanatical religious conviction has supported people in utopian communes. Without religion it appears impossible to maintain life and civilization under

such trying circumstances.

Communes that trade with the outside world but own the means of production provide a much easier life, in fact, in many cases a life of considerable comfort. The evil tendency inherent in them is despotism of the majority, because the group has control over so many aspects of its members' lives. It determines particularly the job that each member must perform. If in addition the commune is committed to sharing its income in kind the member finds every detail of his life regulated by the group. It is doubtful whether a member of such a commune can be said to belong to any society larger than the group.

If we are to find an alternative model of social organization to replace capitalism, the most promising direction seems to be communes that trade with the world, do not control the means of production, and share in money. A group of families (or individuals) pools its wealth and income and pays to each member an equal stipend. The group democratically manages its joint wealth, but each member is free to spend his stipend free of the influences or scrutiny of the others. Each member earns income outside the group, so that he retains freedom of choice and variety in his job.

The establishment of such communes amounts to the direct socialization of property. If each commune contained a rough cross-section of the population by age, class and productivity, it would achieve internally the redistribution of income which capitalism denies to the poor. If the groups were small (less than 500 people) it does not seem unreasonable that individuals would come to feel the same sense of love and duty toward the commune as family members feel toward the family under capitalism. While it will be impossible to work for selfish gain it will be equally impossible to ignore the

effects on the group of not contributing at all. If the communes had about the same wealth their competition would prevent the concentration of power characteristic of capitalism. Personality in such a society would be altered by the constant example of cooperation and equality inside the group.

The great difficulty with communes is to ensure that some will not be too successful. There must be some systematic mechanism by which the society prevents the emergence of rich and poor communes. This mechanism might be founded on an obligation of successful communes to expand and divide so that by taking in new members the successful commune would dilute its wealth.

Communes which trade with the world, do not control the means of production and share in money, can exist in capitalist society without a revolution. The grand capitalist reforms I discussed in section III require a broad consensus of existing interest groups. Workers' control might be achieved in universities, hospitals and other non-profit institutions which have a hierarchic structure only by imitation of capitalist corporations, not through any organic need. But in the capitalist heartland workers' control must wait on the convulsive breakdown of public order and then will depend on a desperate weighing of military advantage. Communes require nothing more than the initiative of a few families who are willing to become an experiment and example in socialism. They could grow with and beyond capitalism like a live graft on a rotting tree.

VI

Radical political and economic theory grew out of the experience and conflicts of European societies. Certain characteristics of European society, especially national political and economic centralization and uniformity, per-

meate most proposals for altering social institutions. There are certain modest but important differences between the American and European experiences that have consequences for radical theory. The strong tradition of local control in America, the curious and illogical duplication of institutions at many levels, the powerful role of private, quasi-governmental organizations (foundations, churches, universities, for example) in ordering public life, all pose problems for a simple-minded application of European theories to American society. But they also suggest that a certain anti-systematic sloppiness about replacing capitalism may produce durable and reliable institutions.

In what I have said before there is an implication that some single alternative must be chosen and carried through consistently. It may perhaps be more fruitful to think of building a socialist society on many different, even contradictory principles. The fundamental goal of destroying the role of the wealthy capitalist ruling class is not inconsistent with replacing it by many different institutions.

For example, in the Middle Ages enormous amounts of wealth were held by corporate religious organizations dedicated to social service. Did this wealth act as a counterweight and check on privately held wealth? For another example, in several places the word "government" has come into this essay. It is easy to think of "government" as the single, supreme and sovereign Federal government, but we have, after all, fifty-one governments. Is it impossible that certain functions and powers that could not be safely entrusted to a single central government could safely be distributed to a number of competing sub-governments? Would we be in so difficult a situation if the income tax were used vigorously by the states and forbidden to the Federal

government as the framers of the Constitution intended?

In designing alternative institutions for a non-capitalist America perhaps the central dilemma of economic power can be met only by distributing it among institutions carefully designed to have and represent disparate conflicting interests. This is clearly a formidable task, considering how many people mistake the present system for a working model of such a diffusion of power.

VII

A person who perceives no antagonism between capitalism and democracy or justice, or freedom or sanity (to recapitulate the earlier criticisms) will not find my argument pertinent. Once democracy is secured by a painful and expensive, but justified, policy of military intervention in poor countries, our society can settle back to achieving its destined triumphs. Presumably these triumphs will take the form of improved material well-being, that is, record-breaking production, since the best possible institutional settlement has been achieved already. Adjustments, like disciplining the police and prosecutors or tax reform, may be desirable, but the American Dream is going to be lived out by nuclear families earning their living and watching TV while a few lucky souls collect dividends and capital gains from owning the means of production and run the government.

Those who feel some discomfort about this picture will believe that there is a predictable connection between social institutions and the quality and justice of life. They may also be toying with the idea of altering institutions to try to improve matters. If we undertake such a program we will embark on a matter of utmost gravity. The record of past attempts shows

a few modest and notable successes and page after page of more or less cataclysmic disaster. It seems elementary that we will want to make our choices as shrewd, prudent and farsighted as possible, that we will try to purge ourselves of shallow arguments, unproved assertions and other forms of wishful thinking.

On this enterprise scientific propositions about human society must be precious aids. These propositions can never by themselves prescribe decisions to a human being, but they can help greatly to formulate the consequences of decisions. Because the propositions bring consequences into the light willy-nilly they generally contribute to the discussion by posing dilemmas.

Fortunately at this fearful juncture, with civil war crescent, our defenses in weak, foolish and irresponsible hands, we can depend on the powerful, relevant analysis of these problems produced by our social scientists and historians to see us through. The best assurance of this is the quality of wise scholars upon their students. Surely we have bred kingly philosophers to counsel the people when once again they retrieve the powers they assigned so warily two hundred years ago.

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
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